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STUDY ON THE INDIA-CHINA WAR

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Abstract: In the early 1950's, the idea of Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai represented the hyperbolic and conspicuous reality of their relationship in the international arena. This cooperative trend between China and India seemed to have a torch bearing impact on the newly emerging countries of 1950's and was also pregnant with a wider implications in the arena of international politics but due to many reasons, the relationship between these two potential powers became confliction in early 1960's.¹ The seriousness of the border dispute did not became apparent until early 1959 when on the heals of the capture of Tibet, the Chinese government came out with direct and extensive claims over some 50,000 Square miles of Indian territory. During five years between 1954-59 incidents of increasing seriousness occurred on the India China border. Since the India government wishfully believed that through negotiations it could come to a peaceful settlement with China. In July 1950, a map was published in an official magazine of China which included some of Indian territory within the Chinese territory. [Ravindra and Madhu. STUDY ON THE INDIA-CHINA WAR. N Y Sci J 2023;16(4):18-21]. ISSN 1554-ISSN 2375-723X (online). http://www.sciencepub.net/newyork. 0200 (print); 05. doi:10.7537/marsnys160423.05.

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Introduction:

The government of India drew the attention of the Chinese authorities to this, China said, however, that they had not yet undertaken a survey of their boundary, nor consulted with the countries concerned and they could not make changes in the boundary as their own. Clearly this remark implied that they regard the boundary between India and china as an open issue which should be the subject of discussion. In July 1955, Chinese troops conducted an undausthorised incursion. In to Barahoti, and in September they even proceeded ten miles South of Nifi lass of Danzon in U.P. in April 1956, an armed Chinese party intruded into Linag Jadang area and in September twice crossed the Shipki pass. The Indian government lodged a strong protest against each of these 1955-56 encroachment in to the central sector of the India-China border. During 1957, Chinese incursion continued and a road running for about a hundred miles across India's Aksai-Chin area was completed. In July 1958, the Khunak-Fort in Ladakh was forcefully occupied by Chinese soldiers, in September they arrested an Indian party on routine patrol duty in the northern part of Aksai-Chin. The Indians were detained and ill treated for nearly five weeks, subsequently there were incursion by the Chinese into Lohit frontier Division of NEFA and Lapthal and Sangch Malla in U.P.²

The situation became more harmful, when with the simultaneous launching by China of a persecution drive against the Dalai Lama forcing him to escape with his entourage to India in the Summer of 1959, came the first armed clashes by the Chinese border guards with Indian frontier patrols.³ The Chinese suppression of the Tibetan revolt was portrayed by India as violation of Tibetan autonomy, and thus, a violation of the 1954 Sino Indian Agreement on Tibet Itself. Beijing was dismayed by India's reactions to the Tibetan situation, the granting of political asylum to the Dalai Lama and 35 others in his entourage, as well as to create a Lhasa type town in Dharamshala in Himachal Pradesh near the Tibet border where a Tibet "Exile" government was put in place the help to the Tibetan rebels in Kalimpong, but most of all, India's guarded but vocal concern about Tibetan Independence. India had become home to 100,000 Tibetan refugees as well. China, in a preemptive action to protect its hold on Tibet, began in August 1959 to push ahead in Aksai Chin area. The conflict in Longju in and Kongka Pass, causing casualties signaled China's new frontier policy. In response to China's "frontier Policy" India developed a counter-move to convert aggressively the "forward policy" initiated since 1954, but which was sporadically implemented. A fresh Government directive in November 1961 to the Indian Army Head Quarter was passed on to area commanders on December 5, 1961. The forward policy was designed to contain China further advance, establish I ndia's presence in Lad to be in a position to cut Chinese supply lines, and ultimately to force a withdrawal. Nehru, however misperceived that the Chinese would not 'respond,

which was perhaps in his seventeen year tenure as Prime Minister his greatest folly. The policy was obviously based on the false premise that the Chinese would not risk on open war with India or use force against Indian posts in Ladakh and NEFA areas.⁴ China's domestic problems may also have been another motivating factor in the military more in Ladakh and NEFA areas. The failure of the so called great leap forward in 1959, and the change of leadership in the communist party in 1958-59, created an impression internationally that China had become weak, and incapable of resisting nibbling on its borders. India was also preening on its victory in Goa in December 1961 over a rag-tag Portuguese occupation force. Nehru began openly speaking about use of force. "If necessary" to clear Indian territory of Chinese "incursions" swayed perhaps by Military victory in Goa and encouraged by NATO's non-response to Goa's military takeover despite Portugal being a member of that US-led military alliance. Nehru broke the news of the border dispute to Parliament in September, 1959 when he submitted white paper number one on India-China relations. This was the first time that the public had been informed by its government about a border dispute which had been in existence since 1954, while Indian people were made to Chant 'Indians and Chinese are brothers'. The white paper came thus as a "big surprise" to Indian Parliament and the public⁵ The turning point was reached in the Galwan valley in July, and in N.E.F.A. In September Dhola, or Che Dong as the Chinese Call it, was the most strategically sensitive spot where India had built a military post in June 1962 considering it to in Indian territory. China fiercely contested this point. Dhola was nearly sixty miles west of Tawang, in that wedge of territory which the Chief of the General Staff judged essential for the defence of India's northern frontier in 1912. On September 8, Chinese troops infiltrated south of the Thag La. They were variably reported as numbering 300, 800 and 1200 on September 20, Chinese guns went in to action against and Indian auxiliary outpost two miles past of Dhola. Two Indian Generals have since publicly expressed their views of their unpreparedness to Meet this situation.⁶

India- China Relations

On 1 April, 1950, India became the first non-socialist bloc country to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Prime Minister Nehru visited China in October 1954. While, the India-China border conflict in 1962 was a serious setback to ties, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's landmark visit in 1988 began a phase of improvement in bilateral relations. In 1993, the signing of an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the India-China Border Areas during Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's visit, reflected the growing stability and substance in bilateral ties. This was augmented by the Agreement on Confidence building Measures in the military Field Along the LAC in the India-China Border Areas.

Visits of Heads of States/Heads of Governments

Cumulative outcomes of seven key visits in recent times have been transformational for our ties. These were that of Prime Minister Vajpayee [2003], of Premier Wen Jiabao [2005 & 2010], of President Hu Jintao [2006], of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [2008 and 2013] and of Premier Li Keqiang [2013].

During Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit, the two sides signed a Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation and also mutually decided to appoint Special Representatives (SRs) to explore the framework of a boundary settlement from the political perspective.

The two sides established a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity during the April 2005 visit of Premier Wen Jiabao. This visit also saw the signing of an agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles which signaled the successful conclusion of the first phase of SR Talks. During Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to India in November 2006, the two sides issued a Joint Declaration containing a ten-pronged strategy to intensify cooperation. Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh visited China in January 2008. A joint document titled "A Shared Vision for the 21st Century" was issued during the visit. When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in December 2010, both sides decided to establish the mechanism of regular exchange of visits between Heads of State/Government. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang paid a State visit to India (Delhi-Mumbai) from 19-21 May 2013.

During this visit, the two sides signed eight agreements and released a Joint Statement. Some of the significant proposals included in the Joint Statement were the decision to designate 2014 as the Year of Friendly Exchanges between India and China, decision to hold the first High Level Media Forum and the agreement to facilitate cooperation and linkages between Indian and Chinese cities & states/provinces. The first meeting of the India-China CEO's Forum was also held during this visit. Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh paid an official visit to China from 22-24 October 2013. He met with President Xi Jinping. Premier Li Keqiang and Chairman of Standing Committee of National People's Congress Zhang Dejiang and former Premier Wen Jiabao.

Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh also gave a speech at the Central Party School in Beijing. The two sides released a Joint Statement titled "A vision for future development of India-China strategic and cooperative partnership." Agreements relating to border, trans-border rivers, establishing service centers for servicing power equipment in India, road transport and Nalanda university were signed. Also signed were three agreements establishing sister-city partnership between Delhi-Beijing, KolkataKunming and Bangalore-Chengdu. It is noteworthy that more than 60% of the agreements between India and China have been signed during the last decade. As of today, both sides have established 36 dialogue mechanisms covering diverse sectors. The leaders of India and China have also been meeting on the sidelines of regional, plurilateral and multilateral gatherings and conferences. Mention may be made of the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to India in March 2012 for the BRICS Summit.

On 27 March 2013, during the 5th BRICS Summit in Durban, Prime Minister met with the new Chinese President Xi Jinping for the first time. The leaders of the two countries have also met on the sidelines of various multilateral summits.

Other high level visits

While External Affairs Minister visited China twice in 2012, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visited India in February. External Affairs Minister, Shri Salman Khurshid, paid an official visit from 9-10 May 2013 and met with Premier Li Keqiang, State Councillor Yang Jiechi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. EAM also met with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Brunei on the sidelines of the ARF Foreign Ministers Meeting on 2 July 2013. Chinese FM Wang Yi also visited India from 9-11 November 2013 to participate in the RIC Trilateral Foreign Ministers Meeting and the ASEM FMs meeting. The Chinese Defence Minister visited India in September 2012. Raksha Mantri Shri A.K. Antony paid a three day official visit to China from 4-7 July 2013. He held delegation level talks with his counterpart Gen. Chang Wanquan and also called on Premier Li Keqiang. A Joint Statement was also released during the visit on 6 July.

The Special Representatives on the India-China Boundary Question have met 16 times so far. The 16th round of talks between the Special Representatives, Shri Shivshankar Menon, National Security Adviser and Mr Yang Jiechi, State Councillor took place in Beijing on June 28-29, 2013. Shri Menon called on Premier Li Keqiang and met with Foreign Minister Wang Yi on 28 June 2013. It may be recalled that at the conclusion of the 15th round of the SR Talks in New Delhi in January 2012, the two countries reached a consensus to set-up the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, which has already met four times. To facilitate high level exchanges of Party leaders from China and State Chief Ministers from India, a special arrangement has been entered into by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA-ILD) since 2004. There are regular Party-to-Party exchanges between the Communist Party of China and political parties in India.

Major dialogue mechanisms

In 2012, several important bilateral dialogue mechanisms held their meetings. The Second Round of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue was held in Delhi in November 2012. The Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission of China, Zhang Ping co-chaired the Dialogue with Deputy Chairman Planning Commission. The two sides signed a total of 4 Governmentto-Government and 7 business related MoUs worth over US\$ 5.2 billion during this dialogue. In August, the Chinese Commerce Minister Chen Deming travelled to India for the 9th Meeting of the Joint Economic Group.

The first dialogues on West Asia and Africa were also held during this year. The year 2013 saw a continuation and expansion of the bilateral dialogue mechanisms. The fifth round of India-China Strategic Dialogue was held in New Delhi on 20th August 2013. The Indian side was led by Foreign Secretary, Smt. Sujatha Singh, and the Chinese side was led by Vice Foreign Minister Mr. Liu Zhenmin. Also, consultations on Afghanistan, the Sixth Round of the CounterTerrorism Dialogue, Consular Talks and the first Central Asia Dialogue were held in China this year. Besides, Foreign Office Consultations between the Foreign Ministries of the two countries was held on September 30, 2013. The first India-China High Level Media Forum was held in New Delhi on September 16th 2013. Mr. Cai Mingzhao, Minister of the State Council Information Office of China and EAM, Shri Salman Khurshid, inaugurated the forum. Earlier, China's Minister for State Administration for Radio, Film, Television, Press and Publicity, Mr. Cai Fuchao visited India and met with the Honorable Minister of State (IC) for Information and Broadcasting Mr. Manish Tewari in Delhi on 18 June 2013

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