A Secure DoS-resistant User Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme with Perfect Secrecies

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Abstract

The goal of a denial-of-service (DoS) attack is to deplete the resource of a targeted server in order that its intended clients cannot obtain the services. Recently, Hwang *et al*. proposed an ID-based password authentication scheme using smart cards against the DoS attack. In their scheme, the major merits include: (1) mutual authentication; (2) the password guessing attack; (3) the replay attack; (4) the impersonation attack; (5) session key establishment; and (6) the server resources exhaustion attack. However, two basic and the most important security properties of a session key establishment are not satisfied in their scheme. One is the perfect forward secrecy. If the long-term secret key is compromised, the previous session key should not be derived. The other is the perfect backward secrecy. If a used session key is compromised, subsequent communications should not be damaged. The intentions of this paper are to show that the above weaknesses exist in Hwang *et al*.'s scheme and to propose a security-enhanced user authentication scheme. The proposed scheme not only can achieve the above admired security requirements, but also can solve the smart card loss problem which is a troublesome security threat in our life and cannot be solved in most authentication and key agreement schemes. [Life Science Journal. 2010;7(1): 89 – 95] (ISSN: 1097 – 8135).

Keywords   Authentication; Client puzzles; Perfect forward secrecy; Perfect backward secrecy

1 INTRODUCTION

IN today, most on-line services over the Internet are based on the client/server architecture. In the architecture, there is a single server to serve a lot of clients. Authentication is basic and is the first step to identify whether a remote client is authorized or unauthorized. After the verification of the identity, the client can be held accountable and the system can decide to give a specific access privilege. Moreover, the system generates a session key to protect their future communications [1-5] [Bellar and Rogaway, 1993;Juang, Feb. 2004;Juang, March 2004;Juang, May 2004;Juang, 2006].

Password is widely adopted into authentication and session key generation schemes since a password-based scheme easily implemented for many applications. Relatively, the entropy of a memorial password is low and is easily suffered from the guessing attack. Therefore, many password-based authentication schemes with the key agreement scheme were proposed to provide robust security requirements [6, 7][Juang, 2008;Wen *et al*., 2005].

Owing to the openness of the Internet, a goal of malicious attackers is to make that the service from the remote server is unavailable. One of the tricks is that the attackers can launch a denial of service (DoS) attack or a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack to deplete the resource of the remote server by sending a huge service requests[8,9] [Agah and Das, 2007;Peng *et al*., 2007]. Hence, the DoS and DDoS attacks should be taken into consideration in the design of a secure user authentication scheme.

By sending a large connection requests to a targeted victim, the attack will cause that the server exhausts the resource to reply the response due to the innateness of the TCP/IP protocol principle. As we know, the DoS or DDoS attacks are easily implemented, but the attacks are hard to be prevented for the server. In general, the defense mechanisms of the DoS/DDoS attacks can be divided into four types [9][Peng *et al*., 2007]: attack prevention, attack detection, attack source identification, and attack reaction. Most previous schemes addressed the works in the network layer and tried to analyze the information of incoming and outgoing packets. The major ideas are to install firewall, intrusion detection system, and intrusion prevention system on the entrance of systems.

Recently, the idea of adopting a puzzle game is paid more attention for defeating the DoS/DDoS attacks [10, 11][Aura *et al*., 2001;Bocan, 2004]. The intention of the idea is to prevent the resources of the server from being exhausted and the sincerity of the client has been shown to the server by performing some expensive cryptographic operations. The goal is to design an acceptable solution of a puzzle for legal clients, but the computation cost is high for malicious outsiders. In general, a puzzle is designed that the challenge is to seek out the miss materials of a hashed value [12, 13] [Juels and Brainard, 1999;Laurens *et al*., 2006]. For instance, z is a digest value of two variables x and y. Given z and y, the goal is to seek out x' to satisfy $z = h(x', y)$. As we know, if x and y are known, it is computationally fast for the server from computing the digest value of x and y. Without the knowledge of x and y, the computation cost is heavy for the client. The computation cost is

disequilibrium between the client and the server because the client could only perform the brute-force search to seek out the solution of a puzzle.

In 2009, Hwang *et al.* proposed a password-based user authentication scheme with session key establishment against the server resource exhaustion attacks and some well-known attacks [14] [Hwang *et al.*, 2010]. Unfortunately, two basic and important security properties of a secure key establishment scheme are not taken into their consideration and we introduce them as follows:

1) **Perfect Forward Secrecy.** A key establishment scheme is said to provide the perfect forward secrecy if the compromise of long-term keys for communicated parties cannot damage past session keys.

   The idea of the perfect forward secrecy is that previous traffics can be locked securely in the past. A widely adopted method is to employ the concept of Diffie-Hellman key agreement to generate distinct session keys, wherein the exponentials are chosen randomly as short-term keys. If long-term secret keys are compromised, previous sessions are not affected by an active adversary [15] [Schneier, 1996]. An admired key agreement should provide this property.

2) **Perfect Backward Secrecy (Known-key Attack).** A key establishment scheme is said to be secure against a known-key attack if the compromise of past session keys cannot allow that either a passive adversary learns the future session keys, or an active adversary impersonates one of the communicated parties successfully in the future. The perfect backward secrecy on a key establishment scheme is analogous to the known-plaintext attack [16, 17] [Minier *et al.*, 2009; van Oorschot and Wiener, 1991] on an encryption algorithm. Firstly, from implementation and engineering decisions point of view, scholars consider that, the probability of the compromise of session keys which were established previously may be larger than that of long-term keys. Secondly, in terms of cryptographic techniques, if a key establishment scheme only took moderate strength into consideration, past session key may be recovered over time. Finally, for some reasons of applications, it is necessary that past session keys may be deliberately uncovered. A secure key agreement should be against this threat.

Another serious security threat is also not taken into consideration in most smart card-based authentication schemes. In a real life, we always worry about the damage of smart cards loss. In 1998 and 2002, Kocher *et al.*[18] [Kocher *et al.*, 1999] and Messerges *et al.* [19][Messerges *et al.*, 2002] stated that this security threat happened by monitoring the power consumption and analyzing the leaked information in the smart card. A secure and admired smart card-based authentication scheme should blockade this threat.

In this paper, we propose a user authentication with key agreement scheme where the perfect forward secrecy

and the perfect backward secrecy can be satisfied at the same time and the merits in Hwang *et al.*'s scheme are also taken into our consideration. Apart from that, our proposed scheme also can be secure against the smart card loss threat. Most smart card-based schemes cannot solve this threat. It implies that if previous schemes want to withstand this threat, their schemes must rely on a tamper-resistant smart card [20] [Nordin, 2004]. As we know, in a tamper-resistant smart card-based scheme, the system cost is high.

In the next section, we first review Hwang *et al.*'s scheme and show their weakness. In Section 3, we present our method. In Section 4, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme and compare the satisfaction of some security criteria between our scheme and Hwang *et al.*'s scheme. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 5.

I. HWANG *ET AL.*'S SCHEME

In this section, we briefly review Hwang *et al.*'s scheme [14][Hwang *et al.*, 2010]. Before we introduce the scheme, we first notify the used parameters as follows.

A. Notations

l v_s is a solution of the puzzle which is decided by the server S.

l N_s and N_i denote the nonces and are generated by the server and the smart card, respectively.

l q_i is a session and is chosen by the smart card.

l $h()$ is a 128bits one-way hash function.

l SK is the secret key of the server.

l sk_s is also a secret key of the server and is used for puzzle verification.

l $puzzle(p, x_1, x_2, …, x_n)$ denotes that given $(p, x_1, x_2, …, x_n)$ to find v such that $h(x_1, x_2, …, x_n, v) = p$.

B. Registration Phase

Client U_i sends the identity ID_i and the chosen password PW_i for registration. Upon receiving the request, the server generates a smart card's identifier CID_i and calculates $S_i = ID_i^{SK} \bmod n$, $h_i = g^{PW_i * SK} \bmod n$, and $W_i = h(ID_i, SK)$ where n is a large prime number and g is a generator of Z_n^*. The server stores $(n, g, ID_i, CID_i, S_i, h_i, W_i)$ into a smart card and issues it back to the client. The phase is finished through a secure channel and the smart card adopted a fingerprint technology to verify the fingerprint of the client.

C. Login Phase

Client U_i enters the password PW_i and imprints the personalized fingerprint through a fingerprint input device. If it succeeds, the card performs the following steps:

1) The card extracts the content (ID_i, CID_i), generates a random nonce N_i and forwards them to the server as its login request.

2) Upon receiving the request (ID_i, CID_i, N_i), the server determines a puzzle solution v_s and calculates $p = h(ID_i, N_i, N_s, v_s)$ and $token_i = h(p, ID_i, N_i, N_s, v_s, sk_s)$. The server sends $(p, N_s, token_i)$ back to the card.

3) The cards tries to seek out the solution v_s to satisfy $h(ID_i, N_i, N_s, v_s) = p$. It should apply a brute-force method to find of the solution without the knowledge of the solution. After the solution is found, the card calculates $X_i = g^{r_i * PW_i} \bmod n$, $Y_i = S_i * h_i^{r_i * token_i} \bmod n$, $Z_i = W_i \oplus q_i$, and $T_i = h(X_i, Y_i, token_i, q_i)$, where q_i is a chosen session key for future communications. The card sends $(ID_i, X_i, Y_i, Z_i, T_i, v_s, N_i, N_s)$ to the server.

4) The server checks the validity of (ID_i, N_i, N_s) and verifies whether $token_i$ is equal to $h(p, ID_i, N_i, N_s, v_s, sk_s)$ for proving the solution of the puzzle. If the above verification holds, the server extracts $q_i = Z_i \oplus h(ID_i, SK)$ and verifies whether T_i is the same as $h(X_i, Y_i, token_i, q_i)$. If it is also true, the server checks whether $Y_i^{SK^{-1}}$ is equal to $ID_i * X_i^{token_i} \bmod n$. If the verification is also correct, the server sets q_i as the session key and sends $h(q_i)$ back to the card for the mutual authentication.

5) Similarly, the card verifies the correctness of $h(q_i)$. If it is true, the card sets q_i as the session key.

D. Perfect Forward Secrecy

Since the communications $(ID_i, X_i, Y_i, Z_i, T_i, v_s, N_i, N_s)$ are always eavesdropped from outsiders, if the attacker compromises the long-term secret key SK, all the session keys can be derived.

1) The attack can construct all the secret keys of clients, $W_i = h(ID_i, SK)$

2) Then the attacker can derive all the session keys $q_i = Z_i \oplus W_i$.

E. Perfect Backward Secrecy

Similarly, the communications $(ID_i, X_i, Y_i, Z_i, T_i, v_s, N_i, N_s)$ are always eavesdropped from outsiders, if the attacker compromises a used session key q_i, we can show that the attacker can impersonate the client U_i to communicate with the server.

1) Firstly, the attacker employs q_i to extract the long-term secret key $W_i = h(ID_i, SK) = Z_i \oplus q_i$.

2) Now, the attacker sends a login request (ID_i, CID_i, N_i) to the server. Without loss of generality, the server will return $(p_{new}, N_{snew}, token_{inew})$ back to the attacker.

3) The goal of the attacker is to forge $(ID_i, X_{inew}, Y_{inew}, Z_{inew}, T_{inew}, v_{snew}, N_i, N_{snew})$ for passing the verifications of the servers.

   I. For simplicity, we assume that the attacker have unlocked the solution v_{snew} of the puzzle p_{new}.

   II. Find an integer a to satisfy $a*token_{new} \equiv token \bmod n$, where $a \equiv token_i * token_{inew}^{-1} \bmod n$.

   III. Select a new session key q_{inew}.

   IV. Calculate $X_{inew} = X_i^a \bmod n$, $Z_{inew} = W_i \oplus q_{inew}$, and $T_{inew} = h(X_{inew}, Y_{inew}, token_{inew}, q_{inew})$

   V. Send $(ID_i, X_{inew}, Y_{inew} = Y_i, Z_{inew}, T_{inew}, v_{snew}, N_i, N_{snew})$

4) Without loss of generality, the server will verify:

   I. Check the validity of (ID_i, N_i, N_s);

   II. Verifies whether $token_{inew}$ is equal to $h(p, ID_i, N_i,$

$N_{snew}, v_{snew}, sk_s)$ for proving the solution of the puzzle.

   III. Extract $q_{inew} = Z_{inew} \oplus h(ID_i, SK)$;

   IV. Verify whether $T_{inew} = h(X_{inew}, Y_{inew}, token_{inew}, q_{inew})$. If it is also true, the server checks whether $Y_{inew}^{SK^{-1}}$ is equal to $ID_i * X_{inew}^{token_{inew}} \bmod n$. If the verification is also correct, the server sets q_{inew} as the session key and sends $h(q_{inew})$ back to the card for the mutual authentication.

   V. The forged request will pass the verification of server and the server will believe the session key is q_{inew}.

5) Correctness.

(1) $Y_{inew}^{SK^{-1}} = Y_i^{SK^{-1}} = (S_i * h_i^{r_i * token_i})^{SK^{-1}} \bmod n$

$= (ID_i * g^{PW_i * r_i * token_i}) \bmod n$

(2) $(ID_i * X_{inew}^{token_{inew}}) = (ID_i * X_i^{a*token_{inew}}) \bmod n$

$= (ID_i * g^{PW_i * r_i * token_i}) \bmod n$

II. OUR SCHEME

In this section, we propose a novel user authentication scheme with key agreement. The proposed scheme not only can keep the same merits of Hwang *et al.*'s scheme, but also can add more admired security properties. The used parameters are the same Hwang *et al.*'s scheme.

A. Registration Phase

Client U_i sends the identity ID_i and the chosen password PW_i for registration. Upon receiving the request, the server generates a smart card's identifier CID_i and calculates $S_i' = (ID_i^{SK} \bmod n) \oplus h(PW_i)$, $h_i' = (g^{PW_i * SK} \bmod n) \oplus h(PW_i)$, and $W_i' = h(ID_i, SK) \oplus h(PW_i)$. The server stores $(n, g, ID_i, CID_i, S_i', h_i', W_i')$ into a smart card and issues it back to the user. The phase is finished through a secure channel.

B. Login Phase

User U_i enters the password PW_i into a card reader. Then the smart card performs the following steps to achieve the mutual authentication with the server.

1) The card extracts the content $(ID_i, CID_i, S_i = S_i' \oplus h(PW_i), h_i = h_i' \oplus h(PW_i), W_i = W_i' \oplus h(PW_i))$, generates a random number N_i and calculates $g^{N_i * PW_i} \bmod n$. Then the card forwards $(ID_i, CID_i, g^{N_i * PW_i} \bmod n)$ to the server as its login request.

2) Upon receiving the request, the server determines a puzzle solution v_s and calculates $g^{N_s} \bmod n$ and $p = h(ID_i, g^{N_i * PW_i} \bmod n, g^{N_s} \bmod n, v_s)$. The server also calculates $p = h(ID_i, g^{N_i * PW_i} \bmod n, (g^{N_s} \bmod n) \oplus h(ID_i, SK), v_s)$ and $token_i = h(p, ID_i, g^{N_i * PW_i} \bmod n, (g^{N_s} \bmod n) \oplus h(ID_i, SK), v_s, sk_s)$

and sends $(p, (g^{N_s} \bmod n) \oplus h(ID_i, SK), token_i)$ back to the card.

3) The cards employs W_i to extract $g^{N_s} \bmod n$ and tries to seek out the solution v_s to satisfy $h(ID_i, g^{N_i*PW_i} \bmod n, (g^{N_s} \bmod n) \oplus h(ID_i, SK), v_s) = p$. It should apply a brute-force method to find of the solution without the knowledge of the solution. After the solution is found, the card calculates $Y_i = S_i * h_i^{N_i*token_i} \bmod n$, $Sess = g^{N_s*N_i*PW_i} \bmod n$, and $T_i = h(Y_i, token_i, Sess, v_s)$. The card sends $(ID_i, token_i, Y_i, T_i)$ to the server.

4) The server checks the validity of ID_i and verifies whether $token_i$ is equal to $h(p, ID_i, g^{N_i*PW_i} \bmod n, g^{N_s} \bmod n, v_s, sk_s)$ for proving the solution of the puzzle. If the above verification holds, the server verifies whether $Y_i^{SK^{-1}}$ is equal to $ID_i * g^{N_i*PW_i*token_i} \bmod n$. If it holds, the server calculates $Sess = g^{N_i*PW_i*N_s} \bmod n$ and verifies whether T_i is the same as $h(Y_i, token_i, Sess, v_s)$. If all of the conditions are held, the server authenticate the identity of the user and sets the session key $SK_{US} = h(Sess)$ as their session key. The server sends $h(Y_i, token_i, Sess+1, v_s)$ back to the card.

5) Similarly, the card verifies the correctness of $h(Y_i, token_i, Sess+1, v_s)$. If it is true, the card also sets the session key $SK_{US} = h(Sess)$ as their session key. We use Figure I to introduce our scheme.


Figure I. The Proposed Scheme

III. DISCUSSIONS

A. Security Analysis

We analyze that the proposed scheme is secure against some well-known security threats.

1) **Mutual Authentication.** The goal of the mutual authentication is to establish an agreed session key SK_{US} between U_i and the server. Let $U_i \xleftrightarrow{SK_{US}} S$ denote that U_i shares a secret key SK_{US} with the server S. The mutual authentication is complete between U_i and S if there is a session key SK_{US} such that U_i believes $U_i \xleftrightarrow{SK_{US}} S$, and S also believes $U_i \xleftrightarrow{SK_{US}} S$. A strong mutual authentication may lead to the following statement [21][Burrows *et al*., 1990]:

I. U_i believes that S believes $U_i \xleftrightarrow{SK_{US}} S$, and

II. S believes that U_i believes $U_i \xleftrightarrow{SK_{US}} S$.

U_i and S can do mutual authentication in the login phase.

I.   Upon receiving $h(Y_i, token_i, Sess+1, v_s)$ in Step

4, U_i will verify whether the received hashed value is correct or not. If it holds, U_i will believe that $(g^{N_s} \bmod n) \oplus h(ID_i, SK)$ is generated by S and believe $U_i \xleftrightarrow{SK_{US}} S$.

II. Since N_i is generated by U_i, U_i believes N_i is fresh and believes that S believes $U_i \xleftrightarrow{SK_{US}} S$.

III. Using the same way, upon receiving $(ID_i, token_i, Y_i, T_i)$ in Step 3, S will verify the validity of $token_i$, Y_i and T_i. If all the conditions hold, S believes that $g^{N_i*PW_i} \bmod n$ is generated by U_i and believe $U_i \xleftrightarrow{SK_{US}} S$.

IV. Since N_s is generated by S, S believes N_s is fresh and believes that U_i believes $U_i \xleftrightarrow{SK_{US}} S$.

2) **The Replay Attack.** The attack could be classified into two categories. Firstly, if the attacker re-submits a used message $(ID_i, CID_i, g^{N_i*PW_i} \bmod n)$ to the server as a new login request. Without loss of generality, the server responses $(p_{new}, (g^{N_{snew}} \bmod n) \oplus h(ID_i, SK), token_{inew})$ back. The

attacker cannot retrieve ($g^{N_{snew}} \bmod n$) without W_i. It implies that the attacker has no ability to send the response to the server in Step 3. Secondly, if the attacker re-submits a used message (p, ($g^{N_s} \bmod n$) $\oplus$ $h(ID_i, SK)$, $token_i$) back to the card. The card believes that the received message is fresh. Based on the difficulty of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, without the knowledge of N_s, the attacker still has no ability to send the response $h(Y_i, token_i, Sess+1, v_s)$ back in Step 4.

3) **The Impersonation Attack without the Smart Card.** Consider that the attacker can send a forged request (ID_i, CID_i, $g^{N_i} \bmod n$) and will get an honest response (p, ($g^{N_s} \bmod n$) $\oplus$ $h(ID_i, SK)$, $token_i$) back. Without the secret key W_i, the attacker cannot retrieve $g^{N_s} \bmod n$. It implies that the attacker has no ability to forge a valid $T_i = h(Y_i, token_i, Sess, v_s)$ to the server based on the difficulty of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem.

4) **The Guessing Attack / Impersonation Attack with the Smart Card.** Consider that the attacker has the ability to extract the content of the smart card, (S_i' = ($ID_i^{SK} \bmod n$) $\oplus$ $h(PW_i)$, $h_i' = (g^{PW_i * SK} \bmod n) \oplus h(PW_i)$, and $W_i' = h(ID_i, SK) \oplus h(PW_i)$). Owing to the openness of the Internet, the attacker also can eavesdrop the communicated messages (ID_i, CID_i, $g^{N_i * PW_i} \bmod n$, p,

$token_i = h(p, ID_i, g^{N_i * PW_i} \bmod n, (g^{N_s} \bmod n) \oplus h(ID_i, SK)$,

v_s, sk_s), $Y_i = S_i * h_i^{N_i * token_i} \bmod n$, $T_i = h(Y_i, token_i, Sess, v_s)$, $h(Y_i, token_i, Sess+1, v_s)$).

I. **Case 1.** The attacker guesses the password PW_i' and tries to verify whether the guessed value is correct on the eavesdropped messages. By the difficulty of the discrete logarithm and the computationally Diffie-Hellman problems and without the knowledge of sk_s, it is hard for the attacker to launch the off-line guessing attack on the messages ($g^{N_i * PW_i} \bmod n$, $token_i$, $Y_i = S_i * h_i^{N_i * token_i} \bmod n$).

II. **Case 2.** The attacker guesses the password PW_i' and tries to verify whether the guessed value is correct on the response of the server.
  l The attacker calculates a forged request (ID_i, CID_i, $g^{N_i * PW_i'} \bmod n$) and sends it to the server.
  l Without loss of generality, the server sends ($p = h(ID_i, g^{N_i * PW_i'} \bmod n, (g^{N_s} \bmod n) \oplus h(ID_i, SK)$, v_s) and $token_i = h(p, ID_i, g^{N_i * PW_i'} \bmod n, (g^{N_s} \bmod n) \oplus h(ID_i, SK), v_s, sk_s)$ back to the card.

l The primary goal of the attacker is to retrieve $g^{N_s} \bmod n$ from ($g^{N_s} \bmod n$) $\oplus$ $h(ID_i, SK)$. Without the correct password, the attacker must employ the guessed value to retrieve $h(ID_i, SK)'$ and $g^{N_s'} \bmod n$. Then the attacker uses $g^{N_s'} \bmod n$ and $g^{N_i'*PW_i'} \bmod n$ to construct $Sess' = g^{N_s'*N_i'*PW_i'} \bmod n, Y_i' = S_i * h_i^{N_i'*token_i} \bmod n, T_i' = h(Y_i', token_i, Sess', v_s)$. If the guessed password is correct, the server sends the response $h(Y_i', token_i, Sess+1', v_s)$ back; otherwise, the server no response. Obviously, this is an on-line detectable guessing attack. The server must join the attack and can detect whether the received messages are valid or not. Most password-based can prevent this attack by limiting an acceptable fails attempts such as three. This method also can be adopted into our scheme.

5) **The Perfect Forward Secrecy.** If the long-term secret key SK of the system is compromised, the session key is still secure in the proposed scheme. Following the scheme, the client sends $g^{N_i * PW_i} \bmod n$ to the server in Step 1 and the server sends ($g^{N_s} \bmod n$) $\oplus$ $h(ID_i, SK)$ back in Step 3. Then the client and the server can establish the same session key $SK_{US} = h(Sess = g^{N_s * N_i * PW_i} \bmod n$). Based on the difficulty of the computationally Diffie-Hellman problem and without the knowledge of the ephemeral keys N_s and N_i, the attacker cannot derive the session key SK_U.

6) **The Perfect Backward Secrecy.** Assume that a used session key $SK_{US} = h(Sess = g^{N_s * N_i * PW_i} \bmod n$) with the communicated messages (ID_i, CID_i, $g^{N_i * PW_i} \bmod n$, p, $token_i = h(p, ID_i, g^{N_i * PW_i} \bmod n, (g^{N_s} \bmod n) \oplus h(ID_i, SK)$, v_s, sk_s), $Y_i = S_i * h_i^{N_i * token_i} \bmod n$, $T_i = h(Y_i, token_i, Sess, v_s)$, $h(Y_i, token_i, Sess+1, v_s)$) are compromised by the attacker. The goal of the attacker is to do the following cases successfully.

I. **Case 1.** The attacker eavesdrops the communications and tries to compromise the future session keys. Since the ephemeral keys N_s and N_i are chosen randomly, based on the difficulty of the computationally Diffie-Hellman problem, it is infeasible to derive the session key $SK_{US} = h(Sess = g^{N_s * N_i * PW_i} \bmod n$).

II. **Case 2.** The attacker sends a forged login request (ID_i, CID_i, $g^{N_i'} \bmod n$) to the server and gets a response (p, ($g^{N_s} \bmod n$) $\oplus$ $h(ID_i$,

SK), $token_i = h(p, ID_i, g^{N_i * PW_i} \bmod n$,

$(g^{N_s} \bmod n) \oplus h(ID_i, SK), v_s, sk_s))$ back. Without the knowledge of the system key SK or the secret keys S_i and h_i, it is computationally infeasible to find out Y_i' and T_i' to pass the equation $Y_i'^{SK^{-1}} = ID_i * g^{N_i * token_i} \bmod n$ and $T_i' = h(Y_i', token_i, Sess', v_s)$.

B. Comparisons

1) Satisfaction of the Criteria

In this subsection, we compare some admired security criteria with the related schemes and show the result in Table I.

2) Computation Cost

We denote that T_H is the time of one hash function operation; T_{MUL} is the time for one modular multiplication; $T_\oplus$ is the time for one exclusive OR operation; and T_{EXP} is the time for one modular exponentiation operation.

We show the comparison of the computation cost in Table II. To provide the perfect forward secrecy and the perfect backward secrecy properties and to solve the smart card loss problem, we add a slight computation cost in client and server sides respectively.

Table I. Satisfaction of the security criteria between our scheme and the related schemes

	Kim et al. [22] [Kim et al., 2003]	Hwang et al. [14][Hwang et al., 2010]	Our Scheme
Mutual authentication	No	Yes	Yes
On-line password guessing attack	Yes	Yes	Yes
Off-line password guessing attack	Yes	Yes	Yes
Message replay attack	Yes	Yes	Yes
Impersonation attack	No	Yes	Yes
Server resource exhaustion attack	No	Yes	Yes
Session key establishment	No	Yes	Yes
Perfect forward secrecy	Not supported	No	Yes
Perfect backward secrecy	Not supported	No	Yes
Security against the smart card loss problem	Not supported*	Not supported*	Yes

*: even if the schemes follow our idea, the schemes still cannot achieve the same requirement.

Table II. Comparison of the Computation Cost

	Computation Cost	
	Client Side	Server Side
Our Scheme	$(n^*+7)T_H + 4T_\oplus + 5T_{MUL} + 3T_{EXP}$	$6T_H + 4T_{MUL} + 3T_{EXP}$
Kim et al.'s scheme [22][Kim et al., 2003]	$3T_{MUL} + 2T_{EXP}$	$1T_H + 1T_{MUL} + 2T_{EXP}$
Hwang et al.'s scheme [14][Hwang et al., 2010]	$(n^*+3)T_H + 1T_\oplus + 3T_{MUL} + 2T_{EXP}$	$6T_H + 1T_\oplus + 1T_{MUL} + 2T_{EXP}$

*: n is the number of hash function operations that is used to solve the puzzle.

Conclusions

We have proposed a security enhanced password-based user authentication scheme with key agreement. By Tables I and II, the proposed scheme not only satisfies the same security criteria with Hwang et al.'s scheme, but also uses a slight computation cost to provide more admired security requirement such as the perfect forward secrecy, the perfect backward secrecy and the smart card loss problem.

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