

Conflict Resolution in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Experience

Izeoma C. Chinda and Frank O. Amugo

Department of Foundation Studies, School of Foundation and General Studies, Captain Elechi Amadi Polytechnic
Rumuola, P.M.B. 5936, Port Harcourt, Rivers State
frankamugo@yahoo.com; +2348037063542

Abstract: Conflict in the world has come to be accepted as a part of human growth and development. The Niger Delta of Nigeria is not an exception. Conflict could be seen as a situation characterized by confrontation and hostilities to secure strategic objectives among people with incompatible interests. In Nigeria, the Niger Delta region has found itself in the “web” of conflicts, spanning over about two and half decades, snowballing into sustained and pervading forms of youth sub-culture and restiveness. The subsisting conflict situation is alleged to stem from the clash of interest between Niger Delta people, oil multi-national companies, and the Nigerian State. The Government responses to crises have rather been punitive against the Niger Delta people. While the interventionist measures in the form of Development Agencies have not been successful, the Amnesty programme, which seemed to have brought some uncanny peace to the region is tentative, as the root causes of the conflicts are still pending. It is against this backdrop that this paper explores the possible ways and means of resolving the conflict through the prism of history and offering holistic and workable suggestions.

[Izeoma C. Chinda and Frank O. Amugo. **Conflict Resolution in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Experience.** *Academia Arena* 2019;11(1):1-7]. ISSN 1553-992X (print); ISSN 2158-771X (online). <http://www.sciencepub.net/academia>. 1. doi:[10.7537/marsaaj110119.01](https://doi.org/10.7537/marsaaj110119.01).

Keyword: Conflict, Militancy, Resolution, Niger Delta.

1. Introduction

Deng (1997: 208) defined conflict as “a social situation in which at least two parties try to acquire the same set of scarce material or immaterial resources at the same time” (208). To this end, Zartman (1989) asserts that conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction, unavoidable concomitant of choices and decisions. The problem there is not to count the frustrations of seeking to remove inevitability but rather of trying to keep conflict in bonds. This is in consonance with Coser’s (1997: 8) conception of crisis or conflict as “a struggle over values and claims to status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponent are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their values”. Conflict is also seen as differences which arise between people necessitating change in at least one person in order for their engagement to continue and develop.

These differences are not without some adjustments. Adejo (2004) observes that conflicts often follow their own courses and usually terminate in the reconciliation of the communities concerned. Such reconciliation restores society to, at least, some degree of or to continue to exist in a changed form. Conflict turns dreams of peace, unity and development into a nightmare. It is also characterized by hostilities and confrontations among people with incompatible interests. Conflicts are experienced in

times great difficulties, restiveness, danger, lawlessness, uprising and so on, involving different groups, individuals in a community or a group of people and a constituted authority or among federating units. While conflict is normal in the sense that it does occur, it is far from being the best way of human interaction. People are more apt to cooperate and harmonize their compatibility than remaining in a crisis stage which signifies a breakdown of law and order. Thus, the resolution of the conflict will be apt in such situation. In conflict resolution, it is expected that the deep rooted sources of conflict are addressed and resolved, and behaviour is no longer violent, while the structure of the conflict has been changed, Maill (1999).

However, Mitchell and Barks (1998) refer to conflict resolution as:

(i) An outcome in which the issues in an existing conflict are satisfactorily dealt with through a solution that is mutually acceptable to the parties, self-sustaining in the long run and productive of a new positive relationship between parties that were previously hostile adversaries and;

(ii) Any process by which such an outcome is achieved. It can be said that conflict resolution is where conflicting parties are mutually satisfied with the outcome of a settlement.

Although the knowledge of history does not simply make for an easy answer in the solutions to conflicts and conflict situations, it at least, makes possible a necessary distinction between those who are cynically using popular prejudice. The more changes occur in society, the more it becomes imperative for the past to be studied with a view to establishing the connection and continuity between what has been and what is, Adejo (2004). This paper, therefore, explores the historical dynamics of conflict resolution in Nigeria with particular reference to the Niger Delta experience. In other words, this paper will look at conflicts, their causes, consequences and resolutions, especially as it concerns the Niger Delta.

2. Causes of Conflicts in Nigeria

History is replete with conflicts all over the world. The resultant effect has always been wanton destruction of lives and properties. Conflicts occur when deprived groups and individuals attempt to increase their share of power, authority and wealth or try to modify the dominant values, norms, beliefs and ideology that have kept them at a disadvantaged position. In a way, the ethnic confrontations seen in West African states today are the result of the imposition of fixed colonial categories upon the groups. Also, the diverse interplay of politics, boundary adjustments, indigene and settlers conflicts, chieftaincy, religion, marginalization, leadership failure, lack of accountability and ethnic chauvinism have led to crises in Nigeria.

These have also led to the militancy of various ethnic movements seeking self-determination, local autonomy, separate identity and true federalism. Some of these are seen in the crisis in Bauchi State in 1995 in a struggle for self-determination and chieftaincy tussle. In 1992, the Zango Kataf crises in Kaduna, which were both ethno-religious and economic. The Odua People Congress (OPC) in South West Nigeria and the Ijaw in the Delta region are good examples. Apart from the colonially induced boundary disputes, Nigerians have inflicted untold wounds on the nation through land and chieftaincy disputes. These include the Aguleri-Umuleri conflagration in Anambra, the Modakeke-Ife mayhem in Osun, the Mbaduku-Obudu conflicts in Cross River, the Junkun-Tiv disputes in Benue, and so on, Adejo (2004). Others are Mangu-Bokko conflicts in J05 Plateau and the Ijaw-Itshekiri, Urhobo-Itshekiri, and the Ijaw-Ilaje in Delta State.

The politicization of the once revered traditional chieftaincy institution has also led to conflicts in various communities in Nigeria. The crises include the tussle over the Sultanship of Sokoto between Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki and Alhaji Ibrahim Maccido, the stool of Olu of Warri in Delta State and the crisis over the Obi of Onitsha's stool, to mention only a few. There

have also been several religious conflicts. Adejo (2004:5) observed that "between 1953 and 1972, over 17 major religious conflicts took place between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria". In 1982, there were the Fagg crises, the Reinhard Bournke riot of 1991 in Kano, the Gideon Akaluka crisis in 1994, among others. The carnage was so devastating that it prompted reprisal attacks in the Southern parts of the country. Among the Moslems, there have also been conflicts between different sects of Islamic Movement. In 1980, the country witnessed the Maitasine crisis, and the Shitte attacks of 1996 and 1997. This conflict started in Kano and gradually spilled over to other Northern States, like Kaduna, Bauchi, and Kastina. Lives and properties were lost in the mayhem that trailed the conflicts. Scarce economic resources, power, money, unemployment and poverty have equally led to conflicts in different communities in Nigeria. It also caused groups to struggle with one another to increase their share of the national resources to maintain their status quo. This has often resulted to crisis situation which has given birth to "ethnic militias" like Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC), Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), to mention a few. These prevalent problems have at one time or the other caused conflicts among the diverse interest groups and sometimes individuals, which has threatened the corporate existence of Nigeria.

3. The Niger Delta Region

The Niger Delta region is located in the Southern part of Nigeria. The region has been described as "one of the world's largest wetlands and Africa's largest delta. It covers some 70,000km with an estimated population of over 21 million in over 200 Communities (Imbua and Inokoba eds. (2008). The region is composed of four ecological zones; namely coastal barrier islands, mangroves, freshwater and lowland rain forest. The region also contains the largest mangrove forest in the world, spanning about 5,400 - 6,000 square kilometers (Imbua and Inokoba eds. (2008). It is the home of the ethnic minority groups in Nigeria, such as the Ijaw, Ibani, Itshekiri, Urhobo, Ikwerre.

Ogoni, Etche, Andoni, Kalabari, Efik, Isoko, Ibibio, Ekpeye, and so on. These people are found in Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta, Ondo, Edo, Imo, Abia, Akwa-Ibom and Cross-Rivers. Before the discovery of oil, the primary occupations of the people were fishing, farming and trading. Ultimately, the discovery of oil, rather than being a source of development has turned out to be one of the greatest undoing of the Niger Delta region due to exploration and exploitation activities of the transnational oil companies and the

Federal Government of Nigeria. These activities have fostered conflicts in the region.

4. The Niger Delta Experience: Causes, and Consequences of Conflicts

With the discovery of oil, most communities in the Niger Delta thought it was an opportunity to have access to basic needs and employment for their children, while for the oil companies, it provided an opportunity for accumulation of capital at the least cost. For the state, it enabled those in power and in top positions to enrich themselves through reckless looting of the nations' oil wealth. This is what Ken Saro-Wiwa calls "internal colonialism", Ofeimun (2009: 57). His analysis is that the elite in Nigeria hijack state power and annul the civic rights of other citizens to determine the distribution of wealth and other social goods. Thus, they artfully constructed and reconstructed the forms of oppressions and exploitation that the British colonial war lords had built up. Mistilis (2009) noted that since 1970, about \$350 billion in oil revenue has flowed to Nigeria, yet, Niger Delta communities continue to live in abject poverty, while the multinationals and the elite live in affluence.

This has resulted to systematic human rights abuses and environmental devastation. The Niger Delta is also faced with severe environmental degradation from oil pollution. The atmosphere has been polluted, water contaminated, trees poisoned and their flora and fauna have virtually disappeared. They face high incidence of health hazards like birth defects, diseases, early deaths and acid rain, so toxic that it corrodes metal roofs. Worse still, there are no infrastructural amenities in the localities such as electricity, portable water and access roads. This has destroyed the very basis of living for the people of the Niger Delta.

Relating the experiences of their sojourn through the Niger Delta, a British Petroleum Engineer said, "I have explored oil in Venezuela, I have explored for oil in Kuwait, I have never seen an oil-rich town as impoverished as Oloibiri", Owugah (2009: 114). David Pass, a Chadian, said, "if I had been born in the oil producing areas of the Niger Delta, I would have since become a revolutionary", Owugah (2009: 114). This reveals the stark neglect of the region where the bulk of Nigeria's oil and gas resources are located.

The exclusion of the Niger Delta region from the benefits of the oil economy, the abysmal underdevelopment in the midst of plenty, and the multi-dimensional struggle for the control of the resources in the region, sharpened the revolutionary tendency of the people and ignited the struggle for

resource control, self-determination, political advancement, environmental protection, and sustainable development among others which take ferocious forms.

According to Ikelegbe (2008), the import of trickle resources flows from the Nigerian State and the oil companies, and the consequences of gross degradation and socio-economic dislocation, have been massive poverty, unemployment and malnutrition among the populace. These have led to frustration, restiveness, anger, bitterness and aggression against the state and the oil companies. From the 1940's, the struggle for self-determination against ethnic domination began in the Niger-Delta. By 1958 the Henry Willink's Commission set up to enquire into the fears of the minorities and recommend ways and means of allaying them, noted that the Niger Delta was "poor, backward and neglected." The commission identified that the people of the Niger Delta were afraid of domination and oppression by the majority ethnic groups in the country. The Commission, therefore, designated the Niger Delta a "special area" that needs to be urgently developed. Despite this, the Niger Delta is still underdeveloped and the demands of the region still neglected. According to Naanen (2004), this fostered the armed insurrection in 1966, culminating in the declaration of a Niger Delta Republic by Major Adaka Boro.

Although this was crushed barely twelve days of its birth, the people have not relented in their quest for self-determination and control of their resources. The Ogoni Bill of Rights pointedly asked for local autonomy that would allow the Ogoni to control both the resources of their land and environment. In 1992, late Ken SaroWiwa, the leader of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) led a protest to challenge the exploration and exploitation of oil in Ogoniland by Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), which was responsible for the environmental degradation of the area. This led to the death of the "Ogoni four" by the angry youths who saw them as "saboteurs." It also culminated to the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogoni people, popularly called the "Ogoni nine," and the bombardment of Ogoni land by the then military administration of Gen Sani Abacha in November, 1995.

Earlier in October, 1990, protests by the people of Umuechem in Rivers State against discrimination in employment opportunities for the youths and the inability of the SPDC to provide basic infrastructural facilities for the community was met with drastic response by the military government who sent in troops on November 1, 1992. There were casualties, deaths and destruction of property including the death

of their traditional ruler Chief Sunny Ogbonna. Similar protests were experienced in Eket, Akwa-Ibom State, where Mobil Unlimited operates and also in Uzere, Delta State.

The Kaiama Declaration by the Ijaw in 1998 embodied the principle of autonomy. They have consistently advocated the restructuring of the political relations in the country in favour of devolution of power to enable them to control a greater share of oil revenue. Thus, the Ijaw youths protesting under the umbrella of Egbesu cult, demanding the stoppage of all oil exploration and exploitation activities on their land, led to the death of about five policemen. The response of the government to this situation was the decimation of Odi Community in Bayelsa State. In 1999, the Choba community in Rivers State was not left out in the unpleasant consequences they faced from Federal Government when their youths protested against the operations of Wilbros, an American oil servicing company. The Federal Government unleashed mayhem on protesting communities as soldiers of occupation were sent to the region to ensure the systematic extinction of the Niger Delta people. Villages were burnt, properties looted, people killed and women raped.

In the case of Ogoni, the Rivers State Government under Col. Dauda Musa Komo set up a Special Internal Security Task Force (SISTF) to terrorize the people. This task force was headed by Paul Okotimu, who boasted of having 221 ways of killing a man. In fact Ikelegbe (2008) asserts that the multinational oil companies are instrumental to the Nigerian States' violent response to peaceful protests while their actions have catalytic effects in bringing local populations into confrontation with state security agencies. Besides, they have shown a distinct lack of concern over the violence directed at the oil producing communities. However, the after effect of war or violence most times is worse than the war, since most negative behaviour is acquired during the period of violence.

This later shapes the lives of the youths who have been exposed to violence. Meanwhile, the military and civilian governments have corruptly enriched themselves through the oil economy at the expense of the development of the region. This had led to the formation of ethnic militias - the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC), National Youth Council for Ogoni People (NYCOP), the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and so on. It has also fostered intra and inter-communal conflicts, which have become lucrative, and the basis for the control of oil-bearing land and control of access to the Transnational Oil Companies (TNCs) in the struggle for a share of the oil wealth.

It has also led to struggles within a struggle: while the ethnic groups struggle with the government for the control of the lucrative oil wells. There is no doubt that poverty and the attempts to control oil revenue remains at the root of violence in the Niger Delta. On their part, the Oil Trans-National Companies (TNCs) themselves contribute to the volatile situation in the Niger Delta through some of their policies and methods. Kemdi (2003: 23) has asserted that multinational companies play "strong", dominant and pervasive roles in Community politics".

They have introduced highly corrupt and divisive community relations policies, which do not augur well for the local traditions. Instead their multifaceted roles resulted to inter and intra-community conflicts that characterized the Niger Delta Region. From 100 percent allocation of revenue income to producing states in the 1950s, the principle of derivation fell to 50 percent in 1960, to 45 percent in 1970, 20 percent in 1975; 2 percent in 1982; 1.5 percent in 1993 and 1995 respectively, and presently 13 percent, while the people of the Niger Delta are still demanding for an upward review to 25 percent, Ekpebu (2008). However, Decrees and Acts like the Land Use Decree of 1978, Petroleum Act of 1969, the Oil Pipelines Acts, etc, have been unfavourable to the people as they are further alienated from their natural resources. Apart from the conflicts generated as a result of oil exploration, there are also politically motivated conflicts where oil politics is also subsumed. It includes intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts over locations of Local Government Headquarters and the creation of Local Government areas.

Examples are the cases of Ogbolomabiri and Bassambiri in Bayelsa State, the Ijaw and Ishekiri, the Urhobo, as well as, the Isoko that are asking for more Local Government Councils in their areas, Williams (2004). The Niger Delta region is today enmeshed in violent conflicts over oil. These are not just pervasive conflicts, violence and insecurity, but a breakdown of social and political order and an increasing ungovernability in the region, Ikelegbe (2008). Much as conflict should be avoided, it is inevitable in life. The concern should be how to nip it in the bud before it takes a violent dimension, or where it does, now to resolve it. The youths, having militantly defended their ethnic and local Communities, discovered their own powers and potentials.

They seized power from various elders and chiefs they suspected to be corrupt, and in some cases, such chiefs were put to death. Their powers were also exercised in connivance with the oil companies in respect to any projects involving money in the Communities. On many occasions, the youths from different clans or areas within the same ethnic groups have fought or killed one another over control of flow

stations, in the bid to claim their own “share” of the oil wealth. The upsurge in the number of ethnic militia groups, emergence of warlords and armed youths and the attendant arms proliferation, has led to the escalation of violent conflicts in the region.

Hence, the region became militarized and came under heavy attack by both government and militant forces. Oil installations were bombed, workers kidnapped, and so many lives lost. The militants also demanded payment of huge sums of money for the release of the kidnapped. Their actions almost crippled the Nigerian state economy. These were the fallouts of the long neglect of the region. It would be pertinent that every mistake made either by the government or by opposition groups should be useful lessons, so that such situations could be avoided or preempted in future.

5. Government Response

Much of the responses of government in the region have been that of “fire and sword.” There have also been several attempts in response to the agitations of the people of the Niger Delta through the establishment of boards and commissions. These commissions or boards were usually frustrated and ended up not being able to carry out their functions effectively. For instance, in 1958, the Willink commission recommended the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Board which was set up in 1961 and disbanded in 1966. Thereafter, there was the creation of the Niger River Basin Authority in 1979, which went bankrupt in 1983.

So also was the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission set up in 1993 to transform the oil bearing communities, but government interference and corruption, led to its demise. By the year 2000, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was established by the Olusegun Obasanjo’s regime, with the mandate to facilitate the rapid development of the region. The Yar’Adua’s administration also commission a holistic regional development blue-print (the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan), prepared by the NDDC. The master plan is an integrated development strategy for the nine states of oil producing Niger Delta.

It was expected to provide a path way for building a growing economy, eliminating prevailing extreme poverty and fostering prosperity in environmentally and socially sustainable manner throughout the region from 2006 – 2020. this was to be implemented in three phases of five years. Also, in response to militancy in the region, the Federal Government established the Technical Committee on Niger Delta, led by Ledum Mitee. The Committee recommended amongst other things, the setting up of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration

(DDR) programme for repentant militants. Only recently, the government granted amnesty to the militants in the region, who gave up their arms and established the Ministry of Niger Delta.

This is an indication of a “ray of light” in the dark tunnel in the Niger Delta struggle. It has yielded positive results as militants have turned in their weapons and their leaders called-off attacks on oil installations. But it is doubtful whether the post-amnesty package will succeed; as Government seems to drag its feet. It has failed to address the issue of fiscal federalism and resource control which is the crux of the struggle. It rather lays emphasis on infrastructural development, capacity building and economic empowerment.

6. Recommendations

Although every conflict has its local coloration, one has to know the cause of a particular conflict in a particular area for effective resolution. The knowledge of the history of the traditions, origins and settlement patterns of the various ethnic groups are imperative for conflict resolution. However, it is important to note that democracy and capitalism cannot thrive in any society in which people do not feel secured. It should, therefore, be the inalienable rights of the communities to own their land in totality, including all resources, both human and material.

Decrees and Acts like the Land Use Decree 1978, Mineral Act, Petroleum Act 1969, and the Oil Pipelines Act, among others, that have hitherto “caged” the people of the Niger-Delta should either be scrapped or replaced by fair and just laws, for there to be proper association between the government and the people. The fact that rage has persisted in the Niger Delta is a clear evidence of the failure of the military option and the “fire and sword” policy to the Niger Delta crisis. The failure of this coercive option requires that some other alternatives be explored. Conflict is not resolved on the battlefield, but through dialogue.

Thus the Federal, State and Local Governments should endeavour to create room for constant dialogue to address conflict-related problems in the Niger Delta. The country has witnessed a lot of crises and various commissions of enquiry set up. Nevertheless, the recommendations of these commissions have in most cases never been implemented. This raises some questions on the credibility of the members of the commission and government objectives. Does it then imply that the Government merely pays lip service to addressing the problems in the Niger Delta? Violence is far from being an appropriate solution to the demands of the people of the Niger Delta. It suffices to stress that due, partly to the enormity of the challenges of development facing the Niger Delta

region, the creation of a Ministry of Niger Delta by the Federal Government is a welcome development.

All the stakeholders must partner with one another in an atmosphere of mutual understanding, trust and respect, to successfully combat the challenges. Hitherto, the conflict management in the country has been one of structural approach where commissions of enquiries and panels have been set up without desired effect. Conflict resolution should appeal to the people's shared value, beliefs, customs and practices. There should be a re-design, reconstruction and re-engineering of both the TNCs and Federal Government policies and operational institutions.

Such must be oriented towards responsiveness, sensitivity, and respect for dialogue and agreements, which should include broad consultation, participation, collaboration, honesty and transparency on the pan of all stake holders. The full implementation of the Master plan for the Niger Delta should be taken seriously. There should be creation of new local government areas in the Niger Delta region as this will certainly enhance greater development in the region. The 10 percent Revenue Allocation advocated by oil producing communities for rapid and sustainable development of the region should be implemented.

7. Conclusion

The crisis in the Niger Delta has remained for too long. It is high time the leadership of Nigeria adopted a pragmatic approach that can bring about peaceful solution to the problem of the region. Military coercion cannot solve the problem; and the emergency measures of instituting boards and commissions to handle development in the area should be reviewed. As earlier stated, conflict is not resolved on the battle field but rather through dialogue. Hence, a good knowledge of the history of past conflicts and how they were resolved will go a long way in nipping similar future conflict situations in the region and elsewhere in the bud.

Correspondence to:

Frank O. Amugo
Department of Foundation Studies, School of Foundation and General Studies,
Captain Elechi Amadi Polytechnic Rumuola, P.M.B. 5936, Port Harcourt, Rivers State
Telephone: +2348037063542
Email: frankamugo@yahoo.com;

References

1. Adejo, A.M. (2004) spec. ed. "History, Conflict Resolution and National Unity in Nigeria." *Journal of the History Society of Nigeria* 1.1 Spec. ed. 1 -11.
2. Chuku, C.D. (2008) "From Ogoni Bill of Rights to Kiama Declaration: A Sociological Analysis of the Niger Delta Crisis." *Journal of Gender of Studies* 2: 12 -22.
3. Coser, L. (1997). *The Function of Social Conflict*. London: Free Press.
4. Deng, F.M. (1997). "Genocide, Violence and Civil Society." *Encyclopedia of Africa South of the Sahara* 2: 207 -213.
5. Edeogu, C.F. (2008). *Peace Building Strategies for Peace in the Niger Delta: A Comprehensive Phased Peace Model*, 67-68.
6. Ekpebu, L. (2008). "The State, Oil Companies and the Niger Delta: Keynote Address." international Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil industry and the Niger Delta Conference Proceeding. Port 1-Jarcourt: Harey Publications, 20-30.
7. Ikelegbe, A. (2008). "Conflict Management and Strategies for Peace Building in the Niger Delta." international Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil industry and the Niger Delta: Conference Proceedings. Port Harcourt: Harey Publication, 107-134.
8. Inokaba, P.K. (2008) and Imbua, D.L. (2008). "Vexation and Military in the Niger Delta: The Way Forward," international Conference on the Nigerian State Oil industry and the Niger Delta: Conference Proceedings. Port Harcourt: Harey Publications, 643.
9. Kemdi, V.D. (2003). "Community conflicts in the Niger Delta: Petro-weapon or Policy Failure?" Berkeley workshop on Environmental Politics Working Paper. Berkeley: California UP. 646-56.
10. Mail, H.R.O and Woodhouse T. (1999). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention; Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
11. Mitchell, C. and Barks, M. (1998). *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem-Solving Approach*. London: Printer. 1998.
12. Mistillis, K. (2004). "The Niger Delta Crisis." Web accessed 23 August, 2009 Naneen, Ben. *Political Economy of Oil and Violence in the Niger Delta.* Concerned Africa Scholars Bulletin, 4-10.
13. Cyril.I. (1997). "Globalization and Local Resistance: The Case of the Ogoni New Political Economy 2.1(1997): 137-142.
14. Ofeimun, O. (2009). "The Niger Delta and the 1999 Constitution," *The Emperor Has No Ed.*

- Dolfie Ola. Benin City: Environmental Rights Action, 5271.
15. Okaba, B. (2008). "Petrodollar, the Nigerian State and the Crisis of Development in the Niger Delta Region: Trends, Challenges and the Way Forward." International Conference on the Nigerian State Oil Industry and the Niger Delta: Conference Proceedings. Port Harcourt: Narey Publications, 40-52.
 16. Omoweh, D. (2004). "Is it the Worn Crisis or the Crisis of the Nigeria State." Association of Concerned Africa Scholars Bulletin: 11-15.
 17. Owugah, L. (2009). "Political Economy of Resistance in the Niger Delta." The Emperor Has No Clothes. Ed. Dolfie Ola. Benin City: Environmental Rights Action, 2009. 105-118. "Resolving conflict in Africa." Tell. 31-33.
 18. Williams, I. (2004) "Niger Delta's Complex Problem Simplified." Pan African Strategic And Policy Research Group:1 -9.
 19. Zartman, I.W. (1989). Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. New York: Penguin.

1/21/2019